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Abstract
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has surged in Latin America (LA) since the mid
1990s. European and North American FDI is of capital importance. We investigate
the FDI-growth nexus in LA allowing for different source countries, regional hetero-
geneity, interaction terms with FDI, and more than 20 growth determinants. We use
Bayesian Model Averaging to address model uncertainty and to select the best mod-
els and most robust parameters. The principal finding is that a positive FDI-growth
nexus in LA requires a functioning legal framework and macroeconomic stability. We
also find that European FDI is only indirectly correlated with productivity growth,
whereas North American FDI is more robust and thus directly correlated with pro-
ductivity growth.
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1 Introduction
Latin American (LA) countries adopted outward-looking development policies in response
to the severe debt crises of the 1980s. Since then, they have considered the attraction of
foreign direct investment (FDI) as a key strategy to promote growth and development. At
the end of the 1990s, FDI accounted for more than 80% of the net private capital flows
into the region (Levy Yegati et al. 2007). FDI from North America (NA) and Western
Europe (EUR) is of capital importance culminating in 70-80% of the stocks in the large
LA countries.1 Recently, EUR has become the largest direct investor in South America,
ahead of NA (UNCTAD 2004; Vodusek 2004). Consequently, several questions arise: To
what extent can FDI flows into LA contribute to growth? Which conditions must be met
for FDI to be beneficial for growth? Are growth effects different when source countries
differ; in particular, does it make a difference whether FDI comes from EUR or NA?
The theoretical literature proposes many arguments for FDI having a positive impact
on growth.2 First, FDI is considered to act as the main channel for international technology
transfers. It increases the productivity of the host country through direct and indirect
effects: productivity effects in the recipient firm and productivity spillovers to upstream
and downstream industries. Second, foreign firms are supposed to increase competition
thus inducing local firms to become more productive. Third, foreign firms are assumed to
invest in training of the work force thereby improving qualifications in the country.
There are relatively few studies that analyze the FDI-growth nexus for LA. On a
macroeconomic level, De Gregorio (1992) investigates growth determinants for the period
1950-85. He finds that FDI inflows are a significant determinant for GDP per capita
growth, having a 3–6 times higher impact than regular investments. Bengoa and Sanchez-
Robles (2003) examine the relationship between economic freedom, FDI, and per capita
growth in a panel for the period 1970-99. They also find a significant positive impact.
Performing Granger causality tests between FDI and output growth for the period 1975-
97 for the three main FDI recipients, Cuadros et al. (2004) confirm a positive FDI-
growth nexus in Mexico but not in Argentina and Brazil. Moreover, there are a few
studies investigating direct productivity and spillover effects of FDI on the firm level in
LA (Blomström and Wolff 1994; Aitken and Harrison 1999; Kugler 2006.)
Two major drawbacks are related to these empirical studies. First, it is not possi-
ble to derive clear conclusions and robust policy implications due to the use of varying
econometric methods, model specifications, country samples, and time spans. Second,
1Henceforth, the abbreviation EUR is used to address our European countries sample. In A.1.2 in the
Appendix, a detailed description of the respective countries is given.
2Among others Blomström and Kokko 1997; Borensztein et al. 1998; Markusen and Venables 1999;
Rodriguez Clare 1996; Görg and Greenaway 2004.
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these studies do not investigate the role of different source countries, most notably EUR
or NA for LA. However, evidence suggests that the pattern and motivation of EUR-FDI
and, thus, its impact on the host country differ from those of NA. EUR companies have
invested in manufacturing and, recently, in public utilities and the service sector mainly
through acquisitions. In contrast, NA investment has focused on greenfield investment in
the manufacturing sector (UNCTAD 2004; Vodusek 2004).
This paper takes the evidence on varying data patterns for FDI decisions in LA se-
rious and incorporates it in the most comprehensive empirical investigation conducted
up to now. We analyze the impact of FDI in the period of rapidly increasing FDI in-
flows, 1990–2003, and account for varying investment patterns to disentangle potentially
different productivity effects. Thus, our study first analyzes total FDI inflows but then
distinguishes between NA- and EUR-FDI. To consider potential conditional factors for
a positive FDI-growth nexus, we look at more than 20 different indicators which can be
clustered into human capital, institutions, infrastructure, trade, macroeconomic policies,
and socioeconomic structure. In addition to numerous interaction terms of these indicators
with FDI, we allow for parameter heterogeneity between different groups of LA countries.
In order to estimate this comprehensive canonical growth regression properly and to
identify robust model specifications, we use Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). BMA was
introduced in cross-country growth regressions by Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Fernán-
dez, Ley, and Steel (henceforth FLS) (2001a), and later adapted to a panel framework
by León-González and Montolio (2004). Since then its applications to growth empirics,
but also to other areas, have surged.3 Our study is the first that applies BMA to the
FDI-growth nexus. BMA is flexible with respect to the size and exact specification of a
model and it does not require the a priori selection of any model. Inference is based on
a weighted average over all models, and a ranking in terms of explanatory power of all
variables and models is endogenously determined.4 Thus, BMA addresses the problem of
parameter and model uncertainty in growth empirics. Uncertainty arises due to lacking
theoretical guidance caused by the ‘openendedness’ of growth theory as there exists no
specific model that could rule out all others (Brock and Durlauf 2001). The abundance of
potential growth determinants, which are often variations of the same theoretical aspect
such as different human capital variables, aggravates uncertainty.5
Our two BMA analyses allow us to distinguish new results. First, the FDI-growth
nexus in LA depends on a country’s dissemination of the rule of law and on macroeconomic
3Among others Brock and Durlauf 2001; Sala-i-Martin et al. 2004; Eicher et al. 2007a, Masanjala and
Papageorgiou 2008.
4See Hoeting et al. (1999) for a general overview of the methodology.
5For a recent survey on the econometrics of (cross-country) growth regressions see Durlauf et al. (2005).
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stability. Second, EUR-FDI is only indirectly correlated with productivity growth, whereas
NA-FDI is more robust and, thus, directly correlated with productivity growth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the hypotheses on the FDI-
growth nexus, and specifies our models. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 describes
the methodology and discusses econometric issues, most notably endogeneity in growth
regressions. Section 5 discusses the results while Section 6 concludes. An Appendix
presents all variables, data sources, and estimation results in detail.
2 Hypotheses and Model Specification
2.1 FDI in Latin America
Growth was high in LA in the 1960s and 1970s but faded due to the debt crises of the
early 1980s. In the wake of economic reforms with the aim to reduce government inter-
ventions and induce economic liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization in line with
the Washington consensus, growth has gained momentum since the first half of the 1990s.
Economic liberalization also entailed an opening towards FDI. Since then, the attraction
of FDI is one of the key strategies to promote growth and development in LA.
Consequently, the total stock of FDI rose steeply at a rate of around 30% per year
since the mid 1990s (Levy Yegati et al. 2007). In 2003, the stock of FDI as share of GDP
reached 84% in Bolivia, 74% in Chile, and 63% in Panama.6 As Figure 1 in the Appendix
shows, the increase in FDI affected all LA countries. NA- and EUR-FDI accounted for
the major share of FDI stocks culminating in 70-80% in the large LA countries. In some
of the smaller LA countries the share of EUR- and NA-investors is lower due to intra-
LA-FDI. While NA-investment has always played an important role in LA, EUR-FDI
surpassed NA-FDI stocks in South America in the 1990s. In 2003, EUR-FDI dominated
in Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay and, slightly, in Brazil
(see Figure 2 in the Appendix). Concerning EUR-FDI, we observe that all major EUR
countries have been investing in LA to a similar extent. Only recently, Spain increased its
share substantially in some countries, such as Argentina, Chile, and Peru.
One can observe clear differences between EUR- and NA-FDI in LA. We address the
potentially different growth effects in the next subsection while discussing recent literature
on varying motives, types, and sectors of FDI and the arising implications for productivity
growth.
6We excluded Panama from our sample because it is a serious outlier that distorted our estimation
results substantially. It serves as an off-shore tax haven and has become the company site of many NA
holdings.
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2.2 The Role of FDI in the Host Economy
The aggregate productivity effects of FDI on the macro level are the sum of several ef-
fects: (i) a direct productivity effect within the firm, since foreign investors commonly
operate with superior technology and managerial practices; (ii) horizontal externalities
on domestic firms operating in the same industry, either in the form of a rise in produc-
tivity in response to increased competition, or as knowledge spillovers when workers are
trained in the foreign firm and afterwards change employment; and (iii) vertical produc-
tivity spillovers to upstream and downstream industries when the foreign firm establishes
linkages and requests improved technological standards.7
The extent of these productivity effects depends (i) on the way in which foreign invest-
ment is provided (greenfield FDI versus mergers and acquisitions); (ii) the type of FDI
(market-seeking/horizontal FDI versus efficiency-seeking/vertical FDI), which is often re-
lated to the distance of the source country, and the applicability of free trade regimes; and
(iii) the main sector of investment, and the sectoral diversity of FDI.
First, it makes a difference whether FDI takes place as greenfield investment or through
mergers and acquisitions. Greenfield investment usually implies larger up-front transfers
of capital and introduces more advanced technologies in the new production site providing
substantial direct productivity effects. However, it is less likely to source locally thus
producing less spillover effects to backward industries (Javorcik 2004). These spillovers are
more important in the case of mergers and acquisitions where the supplier relations of the
acquired firm are kept (Javorcik 2004; Javorcik and Spatareanu 2006). The FDI share of
mergers and acquisitions substantially increased in LA from 20% in the early 1990s to 50%
in 2000 (De Gregorio 2003) because EUR investors used the process of privatization in LA
in the 1990s to acquire public utilities, firms in the energy and telecommunication sector,
and banks. Spain was particularly active in this field (UNCTAD 2004; Vodusek 2004). In
contrast, NA companies were largely making greenfield investments in the manufacturing
sector in Mexico (vertical FDI in the automotive and electronic industry) and Central
America (Vodusek 2004).
Second, the type of FDI matters because vertical FDI typically generates less spillover
effects on the local industry. Only one stage in the production is transferred to the host
country to benefit from cost advantages, and the supplies are commonly imported from the
source country. In such a case, the benefits of FDI culminate in a direct productivity effect,
and the provision of additional production capacity offering employment and upgrading
of skills (Peters 2000). With horizontal FDI, on the other hand, the entire production
7Rodriguez Clare 1996; Aitken et al. 1997; Blomström and Kokko 1997; Borensztein et al. 1998;
Markusen and Venables 1999; Görg and Greenaway 2004.
4
process of a product is placed in the host country providing substantial direct and indirect
productivity effects. Geographically close partner countries, labor cost differentials, and
free trade regimes promote vertical FDI. Javorcik et al. (2004) show for Eastern Europe
that the distance to the source country and the existence of free trade arrangements result
in different types of investment and, therefore, different magnitudes of spillovers.
In 1990–2003, EUR-FDI in LA consisted of a larger share of horizontal FDI because
home markets were too distant and the extent of free trade between EUR and LA countries
was limited. EUR-FDI in the automotive industries in Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina or in
the machinery industry in Chile constituted market-seeking investments in sophisticated
products to conquer new markets (Vodusek 2004). In contrast, for NA investors, LA
countries are close and free trade arrangements are well established with Mexico and
Central America in the NAFTA and CAFTA, respectively. Consequently, a large share of
NA-FDI in Central America takes place as vertical FDI to benefit from cheap labor costs.
All intermediary goods are easily imported under the free trade regime and final products
are re-exported to NA. This type of maquila industry is widespread in Mexico and Central
America in the machinery and electronics industry (Gomez Vega 2004).
Third, the sector of FDI matters. Investments in the manufacturing sector are likely to
generate more spillover effects to the local economy through linkages than investments in
the primary sector, which uses imported capital goods, and operates rather independently
(Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare 2003). However, FDI in the service sector generates an
even higher magnitude of spillovers as it improves the efficiency of local services. Thus,
it enables general productivity gains in the economy (Arnold et al. 2006). Examining
UNCTAD data of the largest affiliates of EUR- and NA-investors in 2002, we find that
in almost all countries the share of EUR-FDI invested in the service sector is larger than
the share of NA-FDI, and that EUR firms are present in many important areas such as
telecommunications, banking or supply of gas, water, and electricity. Moreover, EUR firms
are more numerous, smaller, and more dispersed over all types of industries than NA firms
in South America. In Central America, in contrast, the number of NA-affiliates is larger
than that of EU-firms. Here EUR-FDI tends to be more concentrated (UNCTAD 2002).
Finally, productivity effects from FDI seem to depend on the conditions provided in
the country, most notably a sufficient basis of human capital (Borensztein et al. 1998), the
level of income (Blomström et al. 1994), the openness of the economy (Balasubramanyam
et al. 1999), and financial development (Alfaro et al. 2004).
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2.3 Model Specification and Control Variables
As argued by de Mello (1997, 1999), FDI has a constant marginal product, unlike physical
capital. Thus, it should have a permanent effect on the growth rate. Since FDI (i) incorpo-
rates new technologies in the production function and (ii) leads to (knowledge) spillovers,
an endogenous growth model is a suitable framework to analyze the FDI-growth nexus (De
Mello 1997, 1999). Borensztein et al. (1998) derive the impact of FDI in an endogenous
growth model analytically. They consider an economy that operates with a variety of cap-
ital goods as inputs. A part of those capital goods comes from foreign producers (FDI).
The introduction a new type of capital good requires technological knowledge from out-
side. The higher the fraction of foreign capital goods, the lower are the costs to introduce
new varieties. Borensztein et al. (1998) show that the growth rate in the technologically
lagging economy depends on the level of FDI because it increases the rate of technology
diffusion from developed countries.
We follow this approach and consider FDI in an endogenous growth model with physical
and human capital, and numerous other growth determinants. Consequently, we specify
the following canonical growth regression (subscripts i and t suppressed for simplicity):
y = α + β1INV + β2HC + β3FDI + β4TRADE + β5MACRO + β6INFRA+
+ β7INST + β8STRUC + β9FDI ∗HC + β10FDI ∗ TRADE+
β11FDI ∗MACRO + +β12FDI ∗ INFRA + β13FDI ∗ INST + ε. (1)
In this panel data model, a country’s productivity growth, y, is explained by gross
fixed capital formation, INV; three different human capital variables contained in matrix
HC; our regressor of major interest, FDI; real trade openness, TRADE; 3 macroeconomic
variables in matrix MACRO; 6 infrastructure variables in matrix INFRA; 8 different
institutional variables in matrix INST; 3 structural variables in matrix STRUC, and
country specific fixed effects, α, to account for unobserved heterogeneity among countries.
Additionally, we include 17 interaction terms of FDI with human capital, trade, macroe-
conomic variables, infrastructure, and institutions.8 For the estimation with decomposed
EUR- vs. NA-FDI the number of interaction terms doubles.9 Introducing interaction
8Since BMA is capable of handling highly collinear regressors, we use simple products as interaction
terms. The algorithm described below appropriately weights information added to a regression from two
collinear variables: the Markov Chain will not incorporate models containing regressors that are collinear to
those already included as there is no additional information provided in such a model. In fact, the algorithm
avoids such models and assigns high posterior model probabilities only to models not characterized by this
problem (FLS 2001a).
9Concerning EUR- and NA-FDI, inherited and present cultural ties could also be conditioning factors
to benefit from FDI. However, particularly investment from EUR originates from quite different countries,
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terms is in line with the literature which assumes threshold effects for the positive growth
effects of FDI. Moreover, it allows us to account for heterogeneity in the spillover effects of
FDI between our countries by making the coefficients of the interaction terms to be itself
functions of FDI. Additionally, we allow for parameter heterogeneity in our estimations
by including slope dummy variables for two different country groups: the large economies,
D1, and the rich economies, D2. We apply these dummies to all variables in HC, FDI,
TRADE, and STRUC.
What are our hypotheses concerning the direction of influence for these variables?
Growth theory suggests that the availability of human capital plays an important role
for growth (for a recent survey see Benhabib and Spiegel 2005). Therefore, we test for
the impact of primary, secondary, and tertiary level education. Our data show that the
share of population who completed each level of education increased in LA over the period
considered. In primary and secondary education, the increase was only modest, whereas
it was very pronounced in tertiary education. As argued in the human capital literature,
we use the change in educational attainment instead of enrolment rates as the latter
are too volatile to yield reliable estimation results (among others Temple 2001). The
growth impact of education may differ for our country subgroups (D1 and D2), though.
For rich economies an increase in tertiary education will be more important while the
poor may benefit more from an increase in primary and secondary education. Similarly,
tertiary education may be more important in bigger economies because the availability of
employment opportunities for university graduates is generally larger in big countries. In
general, the dummies should capture differences between social costs and benefits among
the different levels of education (Jimenez 1986). Aside from being a growth factor, human
capital could be an important precondition for productivity gains from FDI (Borensztein
et al. 1998). Therefore, we also interact human capital with FDI.
There is wide theoretical and empirical evidence of the positive effects of trade openness
on growth. Increased openness of a country should force local exporters to improve their
productivity to compete on world markets whereas imports should constitute a channel
of technology transfer (for recent surveys see Alesina et al. 2005; Ventura 2005). Trade
openness generally increased in LA countries during the period although some countries
(Venezuela, Paraguay, Colombia) also faced a prolonged decline of exports. We test the
impact of real openness on growth, with real openness being the share of exports and
imports in current international US$ to GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) current
international dollars. According to Alcalá and Ciccone (2004), this measure is superior
to regularly used nominal measures for trade openness. It appropriately accounts for
only some of which having historical links with LA. Furthermore, recent socio-economic relationships
between LA and both EUR and NA are very diverse.
7
potential price changes in nontradable goods due to productivity effects from openness
accruing more to tradables. Moreover, we account for the possibility that the initial
income level and the (market) size of a country have an effect on productivity gains from
trade openness. Loayza et al. (2005) interact their measure of openness with GDP per
capita and find that the growth effects of trade openness increase with the level of income.
Alesina et al. (2005) analyze the relation between size, openness, and growth and find
a complementary relationship between the benefits of trade openness and (market) size.
Therefore, we interact real openness with both dummies for the rich and the big economies.
Furthermore, trade openness may act as a conditional factor for a positive FDI-growth
nexus because open economies are supposed to be more adapted to external competition
and to take advantage of technology transfers (Balasubramanyam et al. 1999). Thus, we
interact FDI and real openness.
There is ample evidence for the importance of macroeconomic policies for economic
growth (for a recent survey see Easterly 2005). In LA, macroeconomic stability became
a particular concern after the debt crises of the 1980s. The countries faced high infla-
tion (sometimes hyperinflation), high external debts, and government deficits. This was
accompanied by high interest rates and substantial currency devaluations (Corbo et al.
2005). Extensive reforms increased macroeconomic stability, most notably in inflation
and exchange rate volatility. We test whether the improved macroeconomic stability was
beneficial for growth in LA using inflation volatility, debt to export ratio, and exchange
rate volatility as macroeconomic indicators. High values in our indicators are supposed
to increase economic uncertainty, worsen the business climate, and, consequently, reduce
growth. Since the generated uncertainty might also reduce the productivity effect of FDI,
we interact these macroeconomic variables with FDI.
The growth effects of infrastructure investments are usually found to be positive. For
example, Calderón and Servén (2004b) find that the quantity and quality of infrastructure
in general, and in particular of roads, telecommunication, and electric power have a positive
impact on growth. Calderón and Servén (2004a) show that infrastructure endowments
of LA lag behind other middle-income countries, and that respective investments suffered
from the retrenchments of public budgets since the mid 1980s. We find that road networks
and electricity generating capacities in LA have grown modestly in general but stagnated
in several countries. Telecommunication services, such as telephone mainlines, internet,
or PC-use, steeply increased in the 1990s. Besides its direct contribution to growth,
infrastructure is likely to be a conditional factor for a positive FDI-growth nexus. Thus,
we also interact the infrastructure variables with FDI.
Recent empirical growth research finds that the quality of institutions is an impor-
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tant prerequisite for and complement of economic growth (for a survey see Acemoglu et
al. 2005). In their growth regressions for LA, Bengoa and Sanchez-Robles (2003) use the
Fraser Institute’s indicator for economic freedom as institutional variable and find a signif-
icantly positive impact on growth. This composite index comprises subjective judgements
by experts and is often used in growth regressions. As we think it is important to dis-
tinguish between single aspects of institutional quality rather then to look at a composite
index, we use detailed institutional data for LA available from the International Country
Risk Guide (ICRG). We consider the ICRG’s composite indicator for institutional quality,
political risk. Additionally, we include those components that seem to be most important
for LA: corruption, democratic accountability, law and order, and military involvement in
politics.10 The political risk rating, corruption, and the rule of law generally improved
in LA during the 1990s but deteriorated in the second half of the 1990s or after 2000.
Democracy generally improved (with the exceptions of Venezuela and Colombia), and the
involvement of military in politics generally decreased in parallel.11 However, the role of
democracy and military involvement for growth is ambiguous (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001;
Albornoz and Dutta 2007). Finally, we expect that FDI and the quality of institutions in
the host country, most notably the level of corruption or the rule of law, reinforce each
other. In line with the literature that analyses the interdependence of productivity gains
from trade and the quality of institutions (for a survey see Winters 2004), we expect that
a stable institutional environment increases spillovers from FDI on productivity growth in
a country. Thus, we interact all institutional variables with FDI.
Finally, we consider sectoral structures and the degree of urbanization in matrix
STRUC, which we also regard as proxies for different initial conditions in our country
sample. LA countries have been experiencing a steady decline of the agricultural sector,
and an increase in the industrial and service sector. However, there are considerable dif-
ferences between countries. We expect that richer LA economies will enjoy more growth
if they possess a substantial industrial sector while an increase in agriculture would be
negative for growth at that stage of development. Therefore, we interact the two sectoral
variables with the dummies D1 and D2. Finally, a higher degree of urbanization should
lead to agglomeration advantages and enforce productivity growth (Henderson 2005).
10An exploratory correlation analysis showed that there is no high correlation between these different
institutional subcategories in LA.
11Interestingly, in Brazil and Mexico the political role of the military increased. Note, however, that
military involvement in politics does not mean necessarily any direct involvement, for example in the form
of a military government. It comprises very subtle influences of the military in general executive decisions.
9
3 Variables and Data
We include 16 LA countries in our analysis which are listed in the Appendix. The time
period considered is 1990–2003. We are interested in the (direct and indirect) productivity
effects of FDI on economic growth and take the annual growth rate of GDP per labor force
as dependent variable. Table 1 in the Appendix contains the list of included variables with
detailed definitions, sources, and compilations.
For total FDI, we take aggregate LA inward stocks from UNCTAD. The FDI stock
originating from NA and EUR is calculated using the inwards stocks of LA countries
sourcing from NA and EUR reported by UNCTAD. Lists of the respective countries are
given in the Appendix. Since these series include missing values, we complement them
with inward FDI stocks from LA central banks or statistical offices and with outward
FDI stocks from NA and EUR countries reported by the respective central banks and the
OECD.
Several growth determinants are steadily increasing over time in LA. Hence, we iden-
tified unit roots in the following data: educational attainment shares, FDI stocks, trade
openness, consumer price volatility, all infrastructure variables, all institutional variables,
urban population growth, and share of agriculture. To avoid spurious regressions we take
the change of these variables to obtain stationary series. By virtue of this transformation
we analyze FDI flows and their effects on productivity growth. As outlined in Section
2, this is reasonable because current FDI flows should provide immediate productivity
spillovers to the host economy.
4 Estimation
4.1 The Need for Model Averaging
Empirical research on the determinants of economic growth has identified numerous vari-
ables correlated with the growth rate. Durlauf et al. (2005) provide an impressive overview
on variables used in growth regressions culminating in 145 regressors which can be clus-
tered into 43 broader areas, or theories, such as education, finance, government or trade.
Taking into account the limited number of observations on a national level, the number
of growth determinants to be included in a regression is restricted. Any model selection,
however, severely influences the results. In addition, standard results based on a single
model disregard their conditionality on the model chosen. Therefore, they are often not
robust to (minor) changes in the model specification and lead to uncertainty regarding the
robustness and relevance of the policy conclusions.
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The lacking theoretical guidance has led to the increasing use of model averaging tech-
niques to deal with parameter and model uncertainty. Bayesian method are of particular
benefit for model averaging since models are treated as random variables. Thus, the con-
cept of averaging over models can be given a rigorous statistical foundation. Although
this is not the case in frequentist econometrics, there are various ad hoc methods of model
averaging. Prominent examples are Levine and Renelt’s (1992) version of Leamer’s (1985)
extreme-bounds analysis (EBA), or Sala-i-Martin (1997), who attenuated the extreme
EBA-criteria for variables as being robust or non-robust regressors. Both approaches are
preferable to using only one model for a growth estimation. Nevertheless, they do not
address the uncertainty about the true model entirely as each of those methods keeps
certain variables constant in every model and changes only some of the regressors.12
In contrast, BMA does not require selecting any subset of the regressors a priori or
fixing any variables as ‘base-line’ regressors (for a nice introduction see Hoeting et al.
1999).13 First, given a set of potential explanatory variables, BMA separately identifies
models that are expedient to explain growth by allowing for any subset of the explanatory
variables to combine in a regression, and to estimate the posterior probability of any such
combination of regressors. Second, conditional on these posterior model probabilities, the
issue of model uncertainty concerning the most efficient means of stimulating economic
growth can be resolved by estimating the posterior inclusion probabilities of all explanatory
variables.
4.2 BMA
Alternative models M j , with j = 1, ..., J , will be defined by the subsets of kj regressors
they include from the set of K regressors. Thus, all differ in their explanatory variables,
contain individual effects, αi, and are linear regression models. Since it is assumed that the
individual effects enter in all models, the number of possible models is 2K . We have data
for N countries and T periods. The dependent variables for all countries and all models
are grouped in vector y of length NT . The explanatory variables and the N dummy
variables for each country are stacked in design matrix X of dimension NT x (K+N). β
is defined as the full (K+N)-dimensional vector of regression coefficients and individual
12For a detailed discussion of these model averaging techniques and their drawbacks applied to growth
regressions, see Durlauf et al. 2005 and the references therein.
13Another slightly different approach is Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates (BACE) first proposed
in Raftery (1995) and later on in Sala-i-Martin et al. (2004). This method combines Bayesian with classical
estimation techniques and thus abandons the ’truly Bayesian’ framework of proper, informative priors. As
we are highly aware of the caveats related to this abandonment (cf. Section 4.2), we prefer using BMA.
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effects. Any model M j with T observations for country i is represented by:
yi = αiιT + X
j
i β
j + εi (2)
where Xji is the T x k
j submatrix of regressors of model M j and βj is the k vector of
slope coefficients, βj ε Rk
j
(0 ≤ kj ≤ K). ιT is a column vector of T ones, and εi is
the T x 1 error vector that is normal, with covariance matrix σ2IT , not autocorrelated
and independent of Xji , αi and β
j . Although normality is not necessary for consistency, it
guarantees good finite sample properties (FLS 2001b). The effect of variables not contained
in Xj is assumed to be zero.
By averaging over all models the marginal posterior probability of including a certain
variable is simply the sum of the posterior probabilities of all models containing this
variable. Formally, the posterior distribution of any quantity of interest, say θj(= βj , σ, αi),
is an average of the posterior distributions of that quantity under each of the models with
weights given by the posterior model probabilities (PMPs):
p(θj | yi) =
2K∑
j=1
p(θj | yi,M j) p(M j | yi). (3)
This procedure is typically referred to as BMA and it follows from direct application of
Bayes’ theorem (Leamer 1978). P (θj | yi,M j), the posterior distribution of θj under
model M j , is typically of standard form. However, we have to compute the PMPs due
to model uncertainty. Thus, we need to choose a prior distribution over the space M of
all 2K possible models. Following standard practice for BMA in linear regression models,
especially in the context of economic growth (Hoeting et al. 1999; FLS 2001a; Masanjala
and Papageorgiou 2008), we allocate equal prior model probability to each model and set
p(Mj) = 2−K . (4)
This yields a uniform distribution on the model space which implies that the prior proba-
bility of including a regressor is 12 , which is independent of the combination of regressors
included in the model.14 With this prior model probability we get the following expression
14Some authors recommend different choices for p(Mj). For instance, many researchers prefer parsimony,
that is, that simpler models should be preferred to more complex ones, all else being equal. However, regular
posterior odds ratios already include a reward for parsimony. Brock and Durlauf (2001), among others,
raise objections against uniform priors on the model space because of the assumption that the probability
that one regressor should appear in a growth model is independent of the inclusion of others whereas in
fact regressors are typically correlated. They suggest a hierarchical structure for the model prior. This,
however, requires agreement on which regressors proxy the same theories. As stated in Eicher et al. (2007),
such an agreement is often not existent and, therefore, independent model priors are preferable.
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for the PMPs:
p(M j | yi) = p(yi | M
j)
∑2K
i=1 p(yi | M i)
(5)
where p(yi | M j) is the marginal likelihood of Model M j . This is given by
p(yi | M j) =
∫
p(yi | αi, βj , σ,M j) p(αi) p(σ) p(βj | αi, σ,M j)dαi dβj dσ (6)
with p(yi | αi, βj , σ,M j) the model corresponding to (2), and p(α)i, p(σ), and p(βj |
αi, σ,M
j), the parameter priors defined below in equations (7) and (8). Since marginal
likelihoods can be derived analytically, the same holds for the PMP given in (5), and the
distribution given in (3).
In practice, however, computing the relevant posterior distributions is still subject
to challenges as the number of models to be estimated increases with the number of
regressors at the rate 2K . Furthermore, the derivation of the integrals implicit in (6) may
be difficult because the integrals may not exist in closed form. Using at least 50 regressors
in our estimations, we approximate the posterior distribution on the model space M
by applying the Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Composition (MC3) methodology by
Madigan and York (1995) to simulate a sample from M. MC3 is based on a Random
Walk Chain Metropolis-Hastings algorithm which draws candidate models from regions of
the model space in the neighborhood of the current draw and then accepts them with a
certain probability. Posterior results based on the sequence of models generated from the
MC3 algorithm can be calculated by averaging over the draws. To verify convergence of
the algorithm and thus the accuracy of the posterior moments, FLS (2001b) suggest to
calculate the correlation between the analytical and MC3 PMPs for a subset of models,
for example every model visited by the MC3 algorithm, and taking enough replications
to ensure this correlation lies above 0.99.
The Bayesian framework needs to be completed with prior distributions for the pa-
rameters in each model M j , which are αi, βj , and σ. The choice of priors influences the
results, which is why non-informative priors would be preferable.15 However, PMPs can-
not be meaningfully calculated with improper non-informative priors for parameters that
are not common for all models. Thus, FLS (2001b) developed proper priors that do not
require subjective input or fine tuning for each individual model. Given their conclusions,
we use the following benchmark priors for our analysis. We take the {αi} to be indepen-
dently uniformly distributed on the real line, and also adopt a uniform prior for the scale
15Two recent studies have analyzed the effects of prior choices in growth regressions regarding robustness
of parameter choices and coefficient estimates in detail (Ley and Steel 2007; Eicher et al. 2007).
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parameter common to all models which gives us
p(α, σ) ∝ σ−1. (7)
This prior implies that all values of α and σ for ln(σ) are given equal prior weight. Fur-
thermore, this distribution is invariant under scale transformations such as a change in
the measurement units. For βj we choose an informative g-prior structure
p(βj | α, σ,M j) ∼ N(0, σ2[gjX ′jXj ]−1). (8)
It is common practice to center priors over the hypothesis that explanatory variables have
no effect on the dependent variable, especially when there are many regressors but it is
suspected that many of them may be irrelevant. Therefore, we set the mean of βj = 0.











4.3 Endogeneity in Growth Regressions
Endogeneity of regressors constitutes a serious problem in growth regressions. Several of
our regressors have to be considered endogenous: investment, FDI, trade, and institutions.
Whenever possible, we choose our variables so that they can be assumed exogenous: in-
frastructure variables refer to moving averages over the last three years. Instead of the
annual inflation rate we take average consumer price volatility over the last five years. Our
educational variables are assumed to be exogenous because attainment rates rise only after
the degree has been gained and when the person becomes part of the adult population.
Endogeneity leads to biased estimates in OLS regressions. The most common response
to the endogeneity problem has been the use of instrumental variables (IV) in growth re-
gressions. However, the application of instruments is prone to severe problems on economic
and econometric grounds. Statistically speaking, one has to assure the validity of instru-
ments, that is, that they are uncorrelated with the error term, and avoid weak instruments
which would not be strongly correlated with the endogenous variable(s). Otherwise, IV
estimation would lead to inefficient and inconsistent estimates. It is especially difficult
to find valid instruments in the growth context because the openendedness of the theory
and the complexity of the matter make it especially hard to find instruments that are not
growth determinants themselves or that are definitively uncorrelated with omitted growth
determinants. These problems are extensively discussed in Durlauf et al. (2005). There,
the authors also provide a survey of instruments usually suggested for growth determinants
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but advise general caution when using IV estimation in growth empirics.
A panel data framework makes it even harder to find suitable instruments as many of
the standard suggestions, for example geographical characteristics, are not time-varying.
The generally proposed solution to work with lagged values of the regressors in the IV
estimation is also problematic in our case. We considered lagged values as instruments
for all supposedly endogenous variables. Moreover, we experimented with trade measures
and tariffs as instruments for FDI or, alternatively, with tariffs as instruments for trade.
All these potential instruments are not highly correlated with the respective endogenous
regressors in our data set, which would seriously effect the efficiency of any IV estimation.
We assume that the very low correlation of lagged and original variables stems from the
fact that LA data are subject to sudden changes and rapid developments. Apart from
their low correlation with the endogenous variables, these potential instruments could be
conceived as being (omitted) growth determinants themselves.
Economically speaking, endogeneity of regressors means that one can establish a cer-
tain association between the dependent variable and an endogenous regressor but cannot
identify a causal effect. According to Mankiw (1995) and Wacziarg (2002) growth regres-
sions, nevertheless, can be used to benefit from. Durlauf et al. (2005: 117) summarize
their position: ”[...] one should accept that reliable causal statements are almost impossi-
ble to make, but use partial correlations of the growth literature to rule out some possible
hypotheses about the world.” In addition, Wacziarg (2002) argues that the use of IV es-
timation may run into a statistical exercise where the structural economic relationship is
no longer investigated.
In our opinion, this is especially crucial for BMA where one is not only interested in
coefficient estimates, but especially in the identification of robust regressors. The use of
an instrument instead of an (endogenous) variable – originally selected to be in a model on
theoretical grounds – could lead to wrong conclusions about robustness or could conflate
the robustness of the instrument compared to that of the original variable. Therefore, we
refrain from including instruments in our BMAs. We have to keep in mind that this will
not permit us to determine robust growth determinants for the FDI-growth nexus in LA.
Rather, we are able to identify robust growth correlates which can be used to establish a




Our results for the first BMA with total FDI are based on a chain with 1,5 million recorded
draws, and for the second BMA with EUR- and NA-FDI results are obtained from a
chain of 2 million recorded draws. The correlation between visit frequencies and posterior
probabilities lies above the recommended threshold of 0.99 for both BMAs.
First, we present results regarding model uncertainty and list the most effective com-
binations of regressors or model specifications. Thus, we report the PMPs for the ten best
models of both BMAs and list the respective regressors they include in Tables 2 and 4.
The ten best models for the BMA with total FDI account for more than 7% of the total
posterior mass whereas the ten best models for the BMA with decomposed FDI account
for more than 11%. The mean number of regressors in a model is six for the BMA with
total FDI and seven for the BMA with decomposed FDI.
Second, we present results regarding parameter uncertainty and provide a ranking in
terms of regressor importance in Tables 3 and 5. Thus, we report the posterior inclusion
probabilities (PIPs) for each of the explanatory variables in both BMAs. The PIP can be
interpreted as probability that the respective regressor should be included in the evaluation
as it exerts some influence on the dependent variable, regardless of which other explanatory
variables are included. Note that our posterior estimates are not conditional on inclusion as
conditional estimates would overestimate coefficients but underestimate standard errors.16
We base our discussions in the next section on the most important regressors having
a PIP very close to or above the recommended threshold of 0.50. According to Raftery
(1995) evidence for a regressor with a posterior inclusion probability from 50–75 % is called
weak, from 75–95 % positive, from 95–99 % strong, and > 99 % very strong. Masanjala and
Papageorgiou (2008) state that a PIP of 0.50 corresponds approximately to an absolute
t-ratio of one. Moreover, we discuss the regressors that are included in at least one of the
ten best models. These variables do not exert a robust effect themselves but are relevant
in combinations with other regressors. Thus, the are relevant when it comes to advocate
policy packages instead of single policy measures. In line with Durlauf et al. (2008), we
will speak of the latter regressors as being indirectly correlated with growth, whereas the
regressors with a PIP of at least 0.5 are said to be directly correlated with growth in LA.
16See also the discussion in Magnus et al. (2008).
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5.2 Discussion and policy implications
When assessing the relationship of growth with total FDI (Tables 2 and 3 in the Appendix),
our BMA indicates that domestic investment and FDI under specific conditions, that
is, in interaction with institutional variables, are the most robust and important growth
correlates. Therefore, they are always included in the top ten models. Additional variables
included in at least one of the ten best models which are positively correlated with growth
are: primary education, tertiary education in the bigger economies, real trade openness,
and military involvement.17 Political risk is also included but negatively correlated with
growth. From the interaction terms that are important themselves or in combination with
other variables, we see that a positive FDI-growth nexus depends on institutional and
macroeconomic factors in the host country: a sufficiently developed rule of law and, to a
lower extent, a low share of external debt because FDI reacts negatively to large shares of
external debt. Moreover, we find that there exists a robust negative correlation from the
interaction of FDI and democracy with growth in LA.
The second BMA distinguishing between the FDI sources EUR and NA (Tables 4 and
5 in the Appendix) also identifies domestic investment as the most robust growth correlate.
From these results we see that only NA-FDI, under certain conditions, is robustly corre-
lated with growth. These variables are again contained in all top ten models. Additional
factors that are positively correlated with growth and included in at least one of the ten
best models in this second estimation are: trade openness; different types of infrastructure
investments, including modern infrastructure such as PCs; and EUR-FDI in interaction
with institutional variables. From the interaction terms that are important themselves or
in combination with other variables, we see that both EUR- and NA-FDI are correlated
with productivity growth if certain conditions are met in the host country. Both sources
require a sound legal framework for a positive FDI-growth nexus, while EUR-FDI de-
pends additionally on low political risk. NA-FDI on the other hand is especially sensitive
to stable currencies as the interaction with exchange rate volatility is negative.
Summarizing the results from both estimations, we find a positive FDI-growth nexus
under a well developed legal framework, low political risk, and stable macroeconomic
conditions in terms of low exchange rate volatility and low shares of external debt. FDI
itself is not important, whereas especially domestic and, to a lower extent, infrastructure
investments appear to be positively correlated with growth in LA. In combination with
other variables, real trade openness is important, too. These findings are as expected in
Section 2.3 and in line with the literature.
17As all our institution variables are measured in such a way that a higher index indicates better insti-
tutions, the negative sign of MILI means that less military involvement is negative for growth.
17
However, some of our results are astonishing. First, a higher level of education is
generally negatively correlated with growth. This could point at substantial differences
between social costs and benefits among the different levels of education in LA (Jimenez
1986). The level of tertiary education is positively correlated with productivity growth only
in the subsample of big countries. One reason for that might be that big economies offer
more positions where tertiary education is required and that economies of scale or spillovers
among university educated arise only at a sufficient size of the economy. Second, the level of
corruption in a country is not important at all, which is especially surprising in LA where
the poor performance in this area is usually seen as an impediment to growth. Third,
military involvement in politics is positively correlated with growth in our estimations.
Although this seems to be astonishing at first sight, it corresponds to the results for the
interaction of FDI with democracy that exerts a negative influence in LA. Both results
are in line with the literature that establishes ambiguous or even negatives effects for LA
but also other countries (Tavares and Wacziarg 2001; Albornoz and Dutta 2007).
Regarding the role of different sources and their respective investment patterns and
types, we find that NA-FDI is more robust and, thus, directly correlated with productivity
growth in LA after having controlled for potential differences. The PIPs and the posterior
estimates of the interactions of exchange rate stability and rule of law with NA-FDI are
higher than the interactions of political risk or rule of law with EUR-FDI. Strictly speaking,
only the interaction terms with NA-FDI are able to pass the threshold of a PIP of 50%
over which to call a regressor effective. However, both FDI variables appear in interactions
among the ten best models implying that both are related to growth in combination with
other standard growth correlates in LA.
Summarizing, the large up-front capital transfers of NA-FDI directly contribute to
productivity growth in LA and serve as new vintage capital in key branches. Moreover,
NA-FDI seems to be more important for growth because of the higher technology and
know-how imports of efficiency-seeking (greenfield) FDI. EUR-FDI, on the other hand,
is mainly engaged in mergers and acquisitions. Thus, it primarily modernizes formerly
state-owned firms and enables technological spillovers through upstream and downstream
linkages. However, EUR-FDI is only indirectly correlated with productivity growth in LA,
that is, when it is combined with other growth enhancing factors.
6 Conclusion
This study investigates the FDI-growth nexus in 16 LA countries in the period of rapidly
increasing FDI inflows, 1990–2003. We use a canonical growth regression and estimate
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robust model specifications by Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). In line with observed
data patterns, we first analyze total FDI inflows but then distinguish between NA- and
EUR-FDI. In doing so, we account for the major shifts in the regional composition of these
inflows since the 1990s and for the varying types and motives of FDI coming from EUR
as opposed to NA-FDI. We look at more than 20 different controls which can be clus-
tered into human capital, institutions, infrastructure, trade, macroeconomic policies, and
socioeconomic structure. To account for potential conditional factors for the FDI-growth
nexus in LA, we add interaction terms of these controls with FDI. These interactions also
allow us to account for heterogeneity in the spillover effects of FDI between our countries
by making the coefficients of the interaction terms to be itself functions of FDI. Finally,
we allow for parameter heterogeneity between different groups of LA countries.
We apply BMA as it addresses parameter and model uncertainty in growth empirics
arising from lacking theoretical guidance. BMA is flexible with respect to the size and exact
specification of a model and does not require the a priori selection of any model. Inference
is based on a weighted average over all models, and a ranking in terms of explanatory power
of all variables and models is endogenously determined. Consequently, our findings entail
new insights in the conflicting results on the FDI-growth nexus in LA in two respects: We
are in the position to suggest model specifications that are more robust and, therefore,
more reliable as they were selected ‘conditional on model uncertainty’. On that account,
our paper provides an ‘external robustness check’ for related studies showing contrasting
results. Moreover, our own policy implications are more robust because we use consistent
time and country samples in one unified, statistically rigorous method.
Our two BMA analyses allow us to distinguish new results: First, FDI is robustly
correlated with productivity growth in LA subject to certain local conditions. Necessary
prerequisites are a sufficiently developed rule of law and a low share of external debt.
The insights gained from the use of conditioning factors are important and specific to the
situation in LA. In other country contexts an educational or income threshold as well as
trade openness seem to be important for productivity effects of FDI. For the FDI-growth
nexus in LA, on the contrary, a stable legal and macroeconomic environment seems to be
most important.
Second, domestic investments is the most robust growth correlate independent of the
other variables included in our two regressions. In combination with other regressors, real
trade openness, infrastructure, the degree of political risk and of military involvement in
politics, as well as human capital are important factors, too. Regional heterogeneity does
not seem to be an issue in our study, only the growth effects of tertiary education differ
between large and small countries.
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Finally, we find evidence in favor of NA-FDI being more robust in and important for the
FDI-growth nexus in LA. Therefore, we conclude that NA-FDI with its stronger presence
in greenfield investments and vertical FDI generates more productivity spillovers than the
primarily horizontal EUR-FDI that is mostly oriented towards mergers and acquisitions.
The large up-front capital transfers of NA-FDI directly contribute to productivity growth
in LA and serve as new vintage capital in key branches. Moreover, NA-FDI seems to
be more important for growth because of the higher technology and know-how imports
of efficiency-seeking (greenfield) FDI. EUR-FDI, on the other hand, is mainly engaged in
mergers and acquisitions. Thus, it primarily modernizes formerly state-owned firms and
enables technological spillovers through upstream and downstream linkages. However,
EUR-FDI is only indirectly correlated with productivity growth in LA, that is, when it is
combined with other growth enhancing factors.
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Figure 1: Total FDI stock in LA 1990–2003 (share of GDP)
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Figure 2: EUR- vs. NA-FDI stock in LA in 2003 (share of GDP)
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Countries in estimation
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Hon-
duras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
European source countries
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and United Kingdom.
The respective EUR countries may vary from one LA country to another since not all European
countries are present in all LA countries (e.g. Portugal invests practically only in Brazil). EUR
investment is slightly underestimated since official series do not report data for small investors
below a certain threshold.
North American source countries
Canada and United States of America.
Table 1: Variables and data sources
Variable Definition Source Remarks




Constant US$ in 2000




LIT Change of literacy rate WDI
2005



















FDIT Change share total FDI
stock in GDP
UNCTAD Generated from inward stocks
of LA data by country of ori-
gin
FDIEUR Change share FDI stock
from Europe in GDP
UNCTAD Data completed with data
from OECD International In-
vestment Directory for EUR
countries, data from central
banks, and statistical offices
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Table 1: continued
Variable Definition Source Remarks
FDINA Change share FDI stock
from North America in
GDP
UNCTAD See FDIEUR
OPEN Change share exports plus
imports in current int.




Own calculations based on
Alcalá and Ciccone (2004)
CPIV OL Change consumer price
volatility
IFS Standard deviation relative to
country mean, quarterly data
of past 5 years
EXCH Exchange rate volatility IFS Calculated from official ex-
change rate, national cur-
rency per US-Dollar, quar-
terly data of past 5 years




ELEC1 Growth electricity gener-




3 year moving averages
ELEC2 Electric power transmis-








3 year moving averages








WWW Change growth rate inter-
net users per 1000s
WDI
2005
POLRI Change political risk rat-
ing (in logs)
ICRG Increase indicates less risk,
index runs from 0 to 4.6, com-
posite index made up of 12
components
CORR Change corruption index
(in logs)
ICRG Increase indicates less corrup-
tion, index runs from 0 to 1.8
DEMO Change index democratic
accountability (in logs)
ICRG Increase indicates more
democracy, index runs from
0 to 1.8
LAW Change index law and or-
der (in logs)
ICRG Increase indicates better law,
index runs from 0 to 1.8
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Table 1: continued
Variable Definition Source Remarks
MILI Change index military in
politics (in logs)
ICRG Increase indicates less mili-
tary, index runs from 0 to 1.8








IND GDP share industry WDI
2005
FDIT ∗ SEC Interaction term
FDIT ∗ TERT Interaction term
FDIT ∗OPEN Interaction term
FDIT ∗ CPIV OL Interaction term
FDIT ∗ EXCH Interaction term
FDIT ∗DEBT Interaction term
FDIT ∗ ELEC1 Interaction term
FDIT ∗ ELEC2 Interaction term
FDIT ∗ROAD Interaction term
FDIT ∗ PHONEInteraction term
FDIT ∗ PC Interaction term
FDIT ∗WWW Interaction term
FDIT ∗ POLRI Interaction term
FDIT ∗ CORR Interaction term
FDIT ∗DEMO Interaction term
FDIT ∗ LAW Interaction term
FDIT ∗MILI Interaction term
D1 Dummy for big economies
obtained from ranking
GDP in 2000 USD in 1980
and 1990
ARG, BRA, CHL , COL,
MEX, PER, URU, VEN (no
change of group members be-
tween years)
D2 Dummy for rich economies
obtained from ranking
GDP p.c. in 2000 USD in
1980 and 1990
ARG, BRA, CHL, CRI,
MEX, URU, VEN (no
change of group members
between years)
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Table 2: Ten best models for BMA with total FDI
Model Regressors PMP (in %)
1 INV, POLRI, MILI, FDIT *DEMO, FDIT *LAW 2.07
2 INV, PRIM, TERT, D1*TERT, FDIT *DEBT, FDIT *LAW 1.62
3 INV, FDIT *DEBT, FDIT *LAW 1.57
4 INV, OPEN, POLRI, MILI, FDIT *DEMO, FDIT *LAW 1.47
5 INV, FDIT *DEBT, FDIT *DEMO, FDIT *LAW 1.46
6 INV, PRIM, TERT, D1*TERT, FDIT *DEBT, FDIT *DEMO,
FDIT *LAW
1.29
7 INV, PRIM, TERT, D1*TERT, FDIT *LAW 1.26
8 INV, FDIT *DEMO, FDIT *LAW 1.25
9 INV, PRIM, TERT, D1*TERT, FDIT *DEMO, FDIT *LAW 1.20
10 INV, FDIT *LAW 0.95
Table 3: Posterior moments for BMA with total FDI (unconditional
on inclusion)
Rank Regressor PIP Mean SE
1 INV 0.9328 0.3646 0.1443
2 FDIT *LAW 0.8768 2.0119 0.9342
3 FDIT *DEMO 0.5992 -2.2286 2.0648
4 D1*TERT 0.4912 30.9235 34.2762
5 TERT 0.4858 -27.3063 30.3288
6 PRIM 0.3506 0.8589 1.2759
7 FDIT *DEBT 0.3335 -0.0737 0.1152
8 POLRI 0.2634 0.0590 0.1095
9 OPEN 0.2172 0.0355 0.0761
10 MILI 0.1964 -0.0111 0.0249
11 FDIT *POLRI 0.1915 0.9484 2.1518
12 ROAD 0.1908 0.7444 1.7009
13 PHONE 0.1267 0.0101 0.0298
14 DEBT 0.1195 -0.0024 0.0074
15 EXCH 0.1009 0.0012 0.0042
16 D2*IND 0.0920 0.0181 0.0653
17 PC 0.0721 0.0004 0.0015
18 FDIT *ELEC2 0.0698 -0.0799 0.3642
19 FDIT 0.0544 -0.0083 0.0465
20 SEC 0.0527 0.0292 0.1463
21 FDIT *TERT 0.0421 -2.3524 17.2795
22 D1*PRIM 0.0382 0.0869 1.0645
23 FDIT *ELEC1 0.0381 -0.0781 0.5018
24 FDIT *EXCH 0.0367 0.0108 0.0758
25 FDIT *ROAD 0.0354 1.9697 15.6244
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Table 3: continued
Rank Regressor PIP Mean SE
26 D2*PRIM 0.0330 0.0078 0.9659
27 ELEC2 0.0316 -0.0038 0.0290
28 D2*OPEN 0.0314 -0.0033 0.0331
29 DEMO 0.0311 -0.0004 0.0090
30 CPIV OL 0.0302 -0.0001 0.0010
31 FDIT *OPEN 0.0286 -0.0075 0.0931
32 FDIT *WWW 0.0284 -0.0034 0.0278
33 IND 0.0274 0.0018 0.0225
34 WWW 0.0249 -0.0001 0.0010
35 URBAN 0.0240 -0.0262 0.2544
36 D1*OPEN 0.0228 -0.0012 0.0227
37 D2*TERT 0.0221 -0.1598 1.7203
38 D2*AGRI 0.0214 -0.0057 0.0653
39 FDIT *PHONE 0.0209 0.0046 0.1267
40 LAW 0.0204 -0.0002 0.0038
41 AGRI 0.0201 0.0020 0.0281
42 ELEC1 0.0201 0.0012 0.0130
43 FDIT *MILI 0.0198 0.0030 0.0642
44 CORR 0.0196 -0.0002 0.0029
45 FDIT ∗ CPIV OL 0.0194 -0.0005 0.0095
46 FDIT *PC 0.0181 0.0008 0.0134
47 FDIT *SEC 0.0173 -0.0386 1.258
48 D1*SEC 0.0166 0.0014 0.1227
49 FDIT *CORR 0.0162 0.0015 0.0667
50 D2*SEC 0.0159 0.0033 0.0964
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Table 4: Ten best models for BMA with EUR- vs. NA-FDI
Model Regressors PMP (in %)
1 INV, FDINA*EXCH, FDINA*LAW 2.03
2 INV, ROAD, FDINA*EXCH, FDINA*LAW 1.60
3 INV, PHONE, FDINA*EXCH, FDINA*LAW 1.16
4 INV, ROAD, PHONE, FDINA*EXCH, FDINA*LAW 1.04
5 INV, FDIEUR*LAW, FDINA*EXCH 0.81
6 INV, OPEN, FDINA*EXCH, FDINA*LAW 0.53
7 INV, PC, FDINA*EXCH, FDINA*LAW 0.43
8 INV, FDIEUR*POLRI, FDINA*EXCH, FDINA*LAW 0.38
9 INV, ROAD, FDIEUR*LAW, FDINA*EXCH 0.37
10 INV, ROAD, PC, FDINA*EXCH, FDINA*LAW 0.30
Table 5: Posterior moments for BMA with EUR- vs. NA-FDI
(unconditional on inclusion)
Rank Regressor PIP Mean SE
1 INV 0.9863 0.4282 0.1109
2 FDINA*EXCH 0.8719 -1.1674 0.5508
3 FDINA*LAW 0.6499 3.2747 2.646
4 ROAD 0.3257 1.4325 2.2564
5 PHONE 0.2420 0.0214 0.0414
6 FDIEUR*LAW 0.2055 1.2375 2.6205
7 FDIEUR*POLRI 0.1960 2.384 5.3025
8 D1*TERT 0.1760 9.0139 21.5982
9 OPEN 0.1726 0.0258 0.0632
10 TERT 0.1716 -8.0927 19.4724
11 PC 0.1158 0.0007 0.0022
12 FDIEUR*DEBT 0.1021 -0.0578 0.1992
13 FDINA*TERT 0.0976 -26.1312 90.7631
14 FDIEUR*EXCH 0.0924 0.1697 0.6128
15 PRIM 0.0787 0.1653 0.6429
16 DEBT 0.0783 -0.0014 0.0056
17 SEC 0.0698 0.0443 0.1851
18 POLRI 0.0657 0.0095 0.0414
19 FDIEUR*SEC 0.0592 -3.2898 15.3363
20 FDIEUR*ELEC2 0.0585 -0.2416 1.1823
21 FDIEUR 0.0499 -0.0272 0.1555
22 URBAN 0.0451 -0.0909 0.4948
23 D2*IND 0.0434 0.0071 0.0396
24 FDINA*POLRI 0.0405 0.2696 1.6023
25 FDINA*ELEC1 0.0393 -0.2342 1.4086
26 MILI 0.0391 -0.0012 0.0075
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Table 5: continued
Rank Regressor PIP Mean SE
27 FDIEUR*CPIV OL 0.0383 -0.0085 0.0527
28 FDIEUR*PHONE 0.0380 0.1304 0.8549
29 FDINA*ELEC2 0.0369 -0.0563 0.3616
30 D1*PRIM 0.0358 0.0693 0.6250
31 FDIEUR*ELEC1 0.0353 -0.2607 1.6904
32 D2*PRIM 0.0352 0.0496 0.5920
33 FDINA*DEBT 0.0336 -0.0073 0.0501
34 DEMO 0.0306 -0.0012 0.0082
35 D2*TERT 0.0294 -0.3094 2.3052
36 FDINA 0.0294 -0.0064 0.0710
37 FDINA*OPEN 0.0234 -0.0144 0.1765
38 D2*OPEN 0.0231 -0.0025 0.0281
39 WWW 0.0224 -0.0001 0.0012
40 FDIEUR*DEMO 0.0219 -0.1105 1.0198
41 CPIV OL 0.0212 -0.0001 0.0008
42 FDINA*WWW 0.0209 -0.0066 0.0618
43 EXCH 0.0208 0.0001 0.0015
44 FDIEUR*OPEN 0.0202 -0.0063 0.3085
45 FDIEUR*TERT 0.0201 -0.7220 25.7504
46 D1*OPEN 0.0184 -0.0010 0.0197
47 ELEC2 0.0178 -0.0013 0.174
48 FDINA*PHONE 0.0168 -0.0025 0.3804
49 D1*SEC 0.0166 0.0098 0.1613
50 AGRI 0.0166 0.0023 0.0275
51 FDINA*SEC 0.0164 0.1292 2.5559
52 FDINA*CPIV OL 0.0161 -0.0009 0.0293
53 FDINA*DEMO 0.0160 -0.0209 0.2858
54 FDINA*CORR 0.0159 -0.0114 0.1777
55 IND 0.0154 0.0006 0.0132
56 LAW 0.0151 0.0002 0.0033
57 CORR 0.0146 -0.0001 0.0023
58 FDIEUR*MILI 0.0142 0.00034 0.2196
59 D2*SEC 0.0141 0.0066 0.1098
60 D2*AGRI 0.0139 -0.0031 0.0487
61 FDIEUR*WWW 0.0137 -0.0021 0.0397
62 FDINA*PC 0.0137 0.0008 0.0245
63 FDIEUR*ROAD 0.0134 0.4735 23.7059
64 FDINA*ROAD 0.0134 0.4112 6.8318
65 FDIEUR*CORR 0.0132 -0.0015 0.1815
66 FDINA*MILI 0.0128 0.0021 0.1611
67 FDIEUR*PC 0.0122 0.0006 0.0340
68 ELEC1 0.0117 0.0004 0.0084
34
